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Abstract—To cope with the increasing variability and sophistication of modern attacks, machine learning has been widely adopted as a
statistically-sound tool for malware detection. However, its security against well-crafted attacks has not only been recently questioned,
but it has been shown that machine learning exhibits inherent vulnerabilities that can be exploited to evade detection at test time. In
other words, machine learning itself can be the weakest link in a security system. In this paper, we rely upon a previously-proposed
attack framework to categorize potential attack scenarios against learning-based malware detection tools, by modeling attackers with
different skills and capabilities. We then define and implement a set of corresponding evasion attacks to thoroughly assess the security
of Drebin, an Android malware detector. The main contribution of this work is the proposal of a simple and scalable secure-learning
paradigm that mitigates the impact of evasion attacks, while only slightly worsening the detection rate in the absence of attack. We
finally argue that our secure-learning approach can also be readily applied to other malware detection tasks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
DURING the last decade, machine learning has beenincreasingly applied in security-related tasks, in re-
sponse to the increasing variability and sophistication of
modern attacks [1], [3], [6], [27], [33]. One relevant feature
of machine-learning approaches is their ability to generalize,
i.e., to potentially detect never-before-seen attacks, or vari-
ants of known ones. However, as first pointed out by Bar-
reno et al. [4], [5], machine-learning algorithms have been
designed under the assumption that training and test data
follow the same underlying probability distribution, which
makes them vulnerable to well-crafted attacks violating this
assumption. This means that machine learning itself can be
the weakest link in the security chain [2]. Subsequent work
has confirmed this intuition, showing that machine-learning
techniques can be significantly affected by carefully-crafted
attacks exploiting knowledge of the learning algorithm; e.g.,
skilled attackers can manipulate data at test time to evade
detection, or inject poisoning samples into the training data
to mislead the learning algorithm and subsequently cause
misclassification errors [7], [11], [25], [32], [34], [42]–[45].
In this paper, instead, we show that one can leverage ma-
chine learning to improve system security, by following an
adversary-aware approach in which the machine-learning al-
gorithm is designed from the ground up to be more resistant
against evasion. We further show that designing adversary-
aware learning algorithms according to this principle, as
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advocated in [9], [10], does not necessarily require one to
trade classification accuracy in the absence of carefully-
crafted attacks for improving security.
We consider Android malware detection as a case study
for our approach. The relevance of this task is witnessed by
the fact that Android has become the most popular mobile
operating system, with more than a billion users around the
world, while the number of malicious applications targeting
them has also grown simultaneously: anti-virus vendors
detect thousands of new malware samples daily, and there
is still no end in sight [28], [50]. Here we focus our analysis
on Drebin (Sect. 2), i.e., a machine-learning approach that
relies on static analysis for an efficient detection of Android
malware directly on the mobile device [3].
Notably, in this work we do not consider attacks that
can completely defeat static analysis [31], like those based
on packer-based encryption [47] and advanced code obfus-
cation [17], [23], [24], [35], [36]. The main reason is that
such techniques may leave detectable traces, suggesting the
use of a more appropriate system for classification; e.g., the
presence of system routines that perform dynamic loading
of libraries or classes, potentially hiding embedded mal-
ware, demands for the use of dynamic analysis for a more
reliable classification. For this reason, in this paper we aim
to improve the security of Drebin against stealthier attacks,
i.e., carefully-crafted malware samples that evade detection
without exhibiting significant evidence of manipulation.
To perform a well-crafted security analysis of Drebin
and, more generally, of Android malware detection tools
against such attacks, we exploit an adversarial framework
(Sect. 3) based on previous work on adversarial machine learn-
ing [4], [5], [9], [10], [25]. We focus on the definition of differ-
ent classes of evasion attacks, corresponding to attack scenar-
ios in which the attacker exhibits an increasing capability of
manipulating the input data, and level of knowledge about
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Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the architecture of Drebin. First, applications are represented as vector in a d-dimensional feature space.
A linear classifier is then trained on an available set of labeled application, to discriminate between malware and benign applications. During
classification, unseen applications are evaluated by the classifier. If its output f(x) ≥ 0, they are classified as malware, and as benign otherwise.
Drebin also provides an interpretation of its decision, by highlighting the most suspicious (or benign) features that contributed to the decision [3].
the targeted system. To simulate evasion attacks in which
the attacker does not exploit any knowledge of the targeted
system, we consider some obfuscation techniques that are
not specifically targeted against Drebin, by running an anal-
ysis similar to that reported in [30]. To this end, we make
use of the commercial obfuscation tool DexGuard,1 which
has been originally designed to make reverse-engineering
of benign applications more difficult. The obfuscation tech-
niques exploited by this tool are discussed in detail in Sect. 4.
Note that, even if considering obfuscation attacks is out of
the scope of this work, DexGuard only partially obfuscates
the content of Android applications. For this reason, the
goal of this analysis is simply to empirically assess whether
the static analysis performed by Drebin remains effective
when Android applications are not thoroughly obfuscated,
or when obfuscation is not targeted.
The main contribution of this work is the proposal of
an adversary-aware machine-learning detector against evasion
attacks (Sect. 5), inspired from the proactive design approach
advocated in the area of adversarial machine learning [9],
[10]. The secure machine-learning algorithm proposed in
this paper is completely novel. With respect to previous
techniques for secure learning [8], [15], [21], [26], it is able
to retain computational efficiency and scalability on large
datasets (as it exploits a linear classification function), while
also being well-motivated from a more theoretical perspec-
tive. We empirically evaluate our method on real-world data
(Sect. 6), including an adversarial security evaluation based
on the simulation of the proposed evasion attacks. We show
that our method outperforms state-of-the-art classification
algorithms, including secure ones, without losing significant
accuracy in the absence of well-crafted attacks, and can even
guarantee some degree of robustness against DexGuard-
based obfuscations. We finally discuss the main limitations
of our work (Sect. 7), and future research challenges, includ-
ing how to apply the proposed approach to other malware
detection tasks (Sect. 8).
2 ANDROID MALWARE DETECTION
In this section, we give some background on Android appli-
cations. We then discuss Drebin and its main limitations.
2.1 Android Background
Android is the most used mobile operating system. Android
applications are in the apk format, i.e., a zipped archive con-
taining two files: the Android manifest and classes.dex.
1. https://www.guardsquare.com/dexguard
Additional xml and resource files are respectively used to
define the application layout, and to provide additional
functionality or multimedia content. As Drebin only ana-
lyzes the Android manifest and classes.dex files, below
we provide a brief description of their characteristics.
Android Manifest. The manifest file holds information
about the application structure. Such structure is organized
in application components, i.e., parts of code that perform
specific actions; e.g., one component might be associated to
a screen visualized by the user (activity) or to the execution
of audio in the background (services). The actions of each
component are further specified through filtered intents; e.g.,
when a component sends data to other applications, or is
invoked by a browser. Special types of components are entry
points, i.e., activities, services and receivers that are loaded
when requested by a specific filtered intent (e.g., an activity
is loaded when an application is launched, and a service
is activated when the device is turned on). The manifest
also contains the list of hardware components and permissions
requested by the application to work (e.g., Internet access).
Dalvik Bytecode (dexcode). The classes.dex file contains
the compiled source code of an application. It contains
all the user-implemented methods and classes. Classes.dex
might contain specific API calls that can access sensitive
resources such as personal contacts (suspicious calls). More-
over, it contains all system-related, restricted API calls whose
functionality require permissions (e.g., using the Internet).
Finally, this file can contain references to network addresses
that might be contacted by the application.
2.2 Drebin
Drebin conducts multiple steps and can be executed directly
on the mobile device, as it performs a lightweight static
analysis of Android applications. The extracted features are
used to embed applications into a high-dimensional vector
space and train a classifier on a set of labeled data. An
overview of the system architecture is given in Fig. 1. In
the following, we describe the single steps in more detail.
2.2.1 Feature Extraction
Initially, Drebin performs a static analysis of a set of avail-
able Android applications,2 to construct a suitable feature
space. All features extracted by Drebin are presented as
strings and organized in 8 different feature sets, as listed
in Table 1. Android applications are then mapped onto the
2. We use here a modified version of Drebin that performs a static
analysis based on the Androguard tool, available at:
https://github.com/androguard/androguard.
3TABLE 1
Overview of feature sets.
Feature sets
manifest
S1 Hardware components
S2 Requested permissions
S3 Application components
S4 Filtered intents
dexcode
S5 Restricted API calls
S6 Used permission
S7 Suspicious API calls
S8 Network addresses
feature space as follows. Let us assume that an Android
application (i.e., an apk file) is represented as an object
z ∈ Z , being Z the abstract space of all apk files. We then
denote with Φ : Z 7→ X a function that maps an apk file z
to a d-dimensional feature vector x = (x1, . . . , xd)> ∈ X =
{0, 1}d, where each feature is set to 1 (0) if the corresponding
string is present (absent) in the apk file z. An application
encoded in feature space may thus look like the following:
x = Φ(z) 7→

· · ·
0
1
· · ·
1
0
· · ·

· · · }
S2
permission::SEND_SMS
permission::READ_SMS
· · · }
S5
api_call::getDeviceId
api_call::getSubscriberId
· · ·
2.2.2 Learning and Classification
Once Android applications are represented as feature vec-
tors, Drebin learns a linear Support Vector Machine (SVM)
classifier [18], [41] to discriminate between the class of be-
nign and malicious samples. Linear classifiers are generally
expressed in terms of a linear function f : X 7→ R, given as:
f(x) = w>x+ b , (1)
where w ∈ Rd denotes the vector of feature weights, and
b ∈ R is the so-called bias. These parameters, to be optimized
during training, identify a hyperplane in feature space,
which separates the two classes. During classification, un-
seen applications are then classified as malware if f(x) ≥ 0,
and as benign otherwise.
During training, we are given a set of labeled samples
D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where xi denotes an application in
feature space, and yi ∈ {−1,+1} its label, being −1 and
+1 the benign and malware class, respectively. The SVM
learning algorithm is then used to find the parameters w, b
of Eq. (1), by solving the following optimization problem:
min
w,b
L(D, f) = 12w>w︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(f)
+C
∑n
i=1 max(0, 1− yif(xi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
L(f,D)
, (2)
where L(f,D) denotes a loss function computed on the
training data (exhibiting higher values if samples in D are
not correctly classified by f ),R(f) is a regularization term to
avoid overfitting (i.e., to avoid that the classifier overspecial-
izes its decisions on the training data, losing generalization
capability on unseen data), and C is a trade-off parameter.
As shown by the above problem, the SVM exploits an `2
regularizer on the feature weights and the so-called hinge
loss as the loss function. This allows the SVM algorithm to
learn a hyperplane that separates the two classes with the
highest margin [18], [41]. Note that the above formulation is
quite general, as it represents different learning algorithms,
depending on the chosen regularizer and loss function [16].
2.3 Limitations and Open Issues
Although Drebin has shown to be capable of detecting mal-
ware with high accuracy, it exhibits intrinsic vulnerabilities
that might be exploited by an attacker to evade detection.
Since Drebin has been designed to run directly on the mobile
device, its most obvious limitation is the lack of a dynamic
analysis. Unfortunately, static analysis has clear limitations,
as it is not possible to analyze malicious code that is down-
loaded or decrypted at runtime, or code that is thoroughly
obfuscated [17], [23], [24], [31], [35], [36], [47]. For this
reason, considering such attacks would be irrelevant for the
scope of our work. Our focus is rather to understand and
to improve the security properties of learning algorithms
against specifically-targeted attacks, in which the amount
of manipulations performed by the attacker is limited. The
rationale is that the manipulated malware samples should
not only evade detection, but it should also be difficult to
detect traces of their adversarial manipulation. Although
these limitations have been also discussed in [3], the effect
of carefully-targeted attacks against Drebin has never been
studied before. For this reason, in the following, we intro-
duce an attack framework to provide a systematization of
different, potential evasion attacks under limited adversarial
manipulations. Then, we present a systematic evaluation of
these attacks on Drebin, and a novel learning algorithm to
alleviate their effects in practice.
3 ATTACK MODEL AND SCENARIOS
To perform a thorough security assessment of learning-
based malware detection systems, we rely upon an attack
model originally defined in [9], [10]. It is grounded on the
popular taxonomy of Barreno et al. [4], [5], [25], which
categorizes potential attacks against machine-learning algo-
rithms along three axes: security violation, attack specificity
and attack influence. The attack model exploits this taxonomy
to define a number of potential attack scenarios that may
be incurred by the system during operation, in terms of
explicit assumptions on the attacker’s goal, knowledge of
the system, and capability of manipulating the input data.
3.1 Attacker’s Goal
It is defined in terms of the desired security violation and
the so-called attack specificity.
Security violation. Security can be compromised by vio-
lating system integrity, if malware samples are undetected;
system availability, if benign samples are misclassified as
malware; or privacy, if the system leaks confidential infor-
mation about its users.
Attack specificity. It can be targeted or indiscriminate, de-
pending on whether the attacker is interested in having
some specific samples misclassified (e.g., a specific malware
sample to infect a particular device), or if any misclassified
sample meets her goal (e.g., if the goal is to launch an
indiscriminate attack campaign).
43.2 Attacker’s Knowledge
The attacker may have different levels of knowledge of the
targeted system [4], [5], [9], [10], [25], [43]. In particular, she
may know completely, partially, or do not have any infor-
mation at all about: (i) the training data D; (ii) the feature
extraction/selection algorithm Φ, and the corresponding
feature set X , i.e., how features are computed from data,
and selected; (iii) the learning algorithm L(D, f), along
with the decision function f(x) (Eq. 1) and, potentially,
even its (trained) parameters w and b. In some applications,
the attacker may also exploit feedback on the classifier’s
decisions to improve her knowledge of the system, and,
more generally, her attack strategy [5], [9], [10], [25].
3.3 Attacker’s Capability
It consists of defining the attack influence and how the
attacker can manipulate data.
Attack Influence. It can be exploratory, if the attacker only
manipulates data at test time, or causative, if she can also
contaminate the training data (e.g., this may happen if a
system is periodically retrained on data collected during
operation that can be modified by an attacker) [5], [10], [25].
Data Manipulation. It defines how samples (and features)
can be modified, according to application-specific con-
straints; e.g., which feature values can be incremented or
decremented without compromising the exploitation code
embedded in the apk file. In many cases, these constraints
can be encoded in terms of distances in feature space, com-
puted between the source malware data and its manipulated
versions [7], [15], [19], [21], [29], [40]. We refer the reader to
Sect. 3.6 for a discussion on how Drebin features can be
modified.
3.4 Attack Strategy
The attack strategy defines how the attacker implements
her activities, based on the hypothesized goal, knowledge,
and capabilities. To this end, we characterize the attacker’s
knowledge in terms of a space Θ that encodes knowledge of
the data D, the feature space X , and the classification func-
tion f . Accordingly, we can represent the scenario in which
the attacker has perfect knowledge of the attacked system as
a vector θ = (D,X , f) ∈ Θ. We characterize the attacker’s
capability by assuming that an initial set of samples A is
given, and that it is modified according to a space of possible
modifications Ω(A). Given the attacker’s knowledge θ ∈ Θ
and a set of manipulated attacks A′ ∈ Ω(A) ⊆ Z , the
attacker’s goal can be characterized in terms of an objective
functionW(A′,θ) ∈ R which evaluates the extent to which
the manipulated attacks A′ meet the attacker’s goal. The
optimal attack strategy can be thus given as:
A? = arg maxA′∈Ω(A) W(A′;θ) . (3)
Under this formulation, one can characterize different attack
scenarios. The two main ones often considered in adversar-
ial machine learning are referred to as classifier evasion and
poisoning [4], [5], [7], [9]–[11], [25], [45]. In the remainder
of this work we focus on classifier evasion, while we refer the
reader to [10], [45] for further details on classifier poisoning.
3.5 Evasion Attacks
In an evasion attack, the attacker manipulates malicious
samples at test time to have them misclassified as benign
by a trained classifier, without having influence over the
training data. The attacker’s goal thus amounts to violating
system integrity, either with a targeted or with an indiscrimi-
nate attack, depending on whether the attacker is targeting
a specific machine or running an indiscriminate attack cam-
paign. More formally, evasion attacks can be written as:
z? = arg min
z′∈Ω(z)
fˆ(Φ(z′)) = arg min
z′∈Ω(z)
wˆ>x′ , (4)
where x′ = Φ(z′) is the feature vector associated to the
modified attack sample z′, and wˆ is the weight vector
estimated by the attacker (e.g., from the surrogate classifier
fˆ ). With respect to Eq. (3), one can consider here one sample
at a time, as they can be independently modified.
The above equation essentially tells the attacker which
features should be modified to maximally decrease the value
of the classification function, i.e., to maximize the proba-
bility of evading detection [7], [10]. Note that, depending
on the manipulation constraints Ω(z) (e.g., if the feature
values are bounded), the set of features to be manipulated
is generally different for each malicious sample.
In the following, we consider different evasion scenarios,
according to the framework discussed in the previous sec-
tions. In particular, we discuss five distinct attack scenarios,
sorted for increasing level of attacker’s knowledge. Note
that, when the attacker knows more details of the targeted
system, her estimate of the classification function becomes
more reliable, thus facilitating the evasion task (in the sense
of requiring less manipulations to the malware samples).
3.5.1 Zero-effort Attacks
This is the standard scenario in which malware data is
neither obfuscated nor modified at all. From the viewpoint
of the attacker’s knowledge, this scenario is characterized
by an empty knowledge-parameter vector θ = ().
3.5.2 DexGuard-based Obfuscation Attacks
As another attack scenario in which the attacker does not
exploit any knowledge of the attacked system, for which
θ = (), we consider a setting similar to that reported
in [30]. In particular, we assume that the attacker attempts
to evade detection by performing invasive code transfor-
mations on the classes.dex file, using the commercial
Android obfuscation tool DexGuard. Note that this tool
is designed to ensure protection against disassembling/de-
compiling attempts in benign applications, and not to ob-
fuscate the presence of malicious code; thus, despite the
introduction of many changes in the executable code, it is
not clear whether and to what extent the obfuscations im-
plemented by this tool may be effective against a learning-
based malware detector like Drebin, i.e., how they will affect
the corresponding feature values and classification output.
The obfuscations implemented by DexGuard are described
more in detail in Sect. 4.
53.5.3 Mimicry Attacks
Under this scenario, the attacker is assumed to be able to
collect a surrogate dataset including malware and benign
samples, and to know the feature space. Accordingly, θ =
(Dˆ,X ). In this case, the attack strategy amounts to manipu-
lating malware samples to make them as close as possible to
the benign data (in terms of conditional probability distribu-
tions or, alternatively, distance in feature space). To this end,
in the case of Drebin (which uses binary feature values), we
can assume that the attacker still aims to minimize Eq. (4),
but estimates each component of wˆ independently for each
feature as wˆk = p(xˆk = 1|y = +1) − p(xˆk = 1|y = −1),
k = 1, . . . , d. This will indeed induce the attacker to add
(remove) first features which are more frequently present
(absent) in benign files, making the probability distribution
of malware samples closer to that of the benign data. It is
worth finally remarking that this is a more sophisticated
mimicry attack than those commonly used in practice, in
which an attacker is usually assumed to merge a malware
application with a benign one [43], [50].
3.5.4 Limited-Knowledge (LK) Attacks
In addition to the previous case, here the attacker knows
the learning algorithm L used by the targeted system,
and can learn a surrogate classifier on the available data.
The knowledge-parameter vector can be thus encoded as
θ = (Dˆ,X , fˆ), being fˆ the surrogate classifier used to
approximate the true f . In this case, the attacker exploits
the estimate of wˆ obtained from the surrogate classifier fˆ to
construct the evasion samples, according to Eq. (4).
3.5.5 Perfect-Knowledge (PK) Attacks
This is the worst-case setting in which also the targeted clas-
sifier is known to the attacker, i.e., θ = (D,X , f). Although
it is not very likely to happen in practice that the attacker
gets to know even the trained classifier’s parameters (i.e.,w
and b in Eq. 1), this setting is particularly interesting as it
provides an upper bound on the performance degradation
incurred by the system under attack, and can be used as
reference to evaluate the effectiveness of the system under
the other simulated attack scenarios.
3.6 Malware Data Manipulation
As stated in Sect. 3.3, one has to discuss how the attacker can
manipulate malware applications to create the correspond-
ing evasion attack samples. To this end, we consider two
main settings in our evaluation, detailed below.
Feature Addition. Within this setting, the attacker can inde-
pendently inject (i.e., set to 1) every feature.
Feature Addition and Removal. This scenario simulates a
more powerful attacker that can inject every feature, and
also remove (i.e., set to 0) features from the dexcode.
These settings are motivated by the fact that malware has
to be manipulated to evade detection, but its semantics and
intrusive functionality must be preserved. In this respect,
feature addition is generally a safe operation, in particular,
when injecting manifest features (e.g., adding permissions
does not influence any existing application functionality).
With respect to the dexcode, one may also safely introduce
information that is not actively executed, by adding code
after return instructions (dead code) or with methods that
are never called by any invoke type instructions. Listing 1
shows an example where a URL feature is introduced by
adding a method that is never invoked in the code.
.method public addUrlFeature()V
.locals 2
const-string v1, "http://www.example.com"
invoke-direct {v0, v1},
Ljava/net/URL;-><init>(Ljava/lang/String;)V
return-void
.end method
Listing 1. Smali code to add a URL feature.
However, this only applies when such information is
not directly executed by the application, and could be
stopped at the parsing level by analyzing only the meth-
ods belonging to the application call graph. In this case,
the attacker would be enforced to change the executed
code, and this requires considering additional and stricter
constraints. For example, if she wants to add a suspicious
API call to a dexcode method that is executed by the
application, she should adopt virtual machine registers that
have not been used before by the application. Moreover,
the attacker should pay attention to possible artifacts or
undesired functionalities that are brought by the injected
calls, which may influence the semantics of the original
program. Accordingly, injecting a large number of features
may not always be feasible.
Feature removal is even a more complicated operation.
Removing permissions from the manifest is not possible,
as this would limit the application functionality. The same
holds for intent filters. Some application component names
can be changed but, as stated in Sect. 4, this operation is not
easy to be automatically performed: the attacker must en-
sure that the application component names in the dexcode
are changed accordingly, and must not modify any of the
entry points. Furthermore, the feasible changes may only
slightly affect the whole manifest structure (as shown in
our experiments with automated obfuscation tools). With
respect to the dexcode, multiple ways can be exploited to
remove its features; e.g., it is possible to hide IP addresses
(if they are stored as strings) by encrypting them with the
introduction of additional functions, and decrypting them
at runtime. Of course, this should be done by avoiding the
addition of features that are already used by the system (e.g.,
function calls that are present in the training data).
With respect to suspicious and restricted API calls, the
attacker should encrypt the method or the class invoking
them. However, this could introduce other calls that might
increase the suspiciousness of the application. Moreover,
one mistake at removing such API references might com-
pletely destroy the application functionality. The reason is
that Android uses a verification system to check the integrity
of an application during execution (e.g., it will close the
application, if a register passed as a parameter to an API
call contains a wrong type), and chances of compromising
this behavior increase if features are deleted carelessly.
For the aforementioned reasons, performing a fine-
grained evasion attack that changes a lot of features may
be very difficult in practice, without compromising the mali-
6cious application functionality. In addition, another problem
for the attacker is getting to know precisely which features
should be added or removed, which makes the construction
of evasion attack samples even more complicated.
4 DEXGUARD-BASED OBFUSCATION ATTACKS
Although commercial obfuscators are designed to protect
benign applications against reverse-engineering attempts,
it has been recently shown that they can also be used to
evade anti-malware detection systems [30]. We thus use
DexGuard, a popular obfuscator for Android, to simulate
attacks in which no specific knowledge of the targeted
system is exploited, as discussed in Sect. 3.5.2. Recall that,
although considering obfuscation attacks is out of the scope
of this work, the obfuscation techniques implemented by
DexGuard do not completely obfuscate the code. For this
reason, we aim to understand whether this may make static
analysis totally ineffective, and how it affects our strategy
to improve classifier security. A brief description of the
DexGuard-based obfuscation attacks is given below.
Trivial obfuscation. This strategy changes the names of
implemented application packages, classes, methods and
fields, by replacing them with random characters. Trivial
obfuscation also performs negligible modifications to some
manifest features by renaming some application com-
ponents that are not entry points (see Sect. 2.1). As the
application functionality must be preserved, Trivial obfus-
cation does not rename any system API or method imported
from native libraries. Given that Drebin mainly extracts
information from system APIs, we expect that its detection
capability will be only barely affected by this obfuscation.
String Encryption. This strategy encrypts strings defined
in the dexcode with the instruction const-string. Such
strings can be visualized during the application execution,
or may be used as variables. Thus, even if they are retrieved
through an identifier, their value must be preserved dur-
ing the program execution. For this reason, an additional
method is added to decrypt them at runtime, when re-
quired. This obfuscation tends to remove URL features (S8)
that are stored as strings in the dexcode. Features corre-
sponding to the decryption routines extracted by Drebin (S7)
are instead not affected, as the decryption routines added by
DexGuard do not belong to the system APIs.
Reflection. This obfuscation technique uses the Java Reflec-
tion API to replace invoke-type instructions with calls
that belong to the Java.lang.Reflect class. The main
effect of this action is destroying the application call graph.
However, this technique does not affect the system API
names, as they do not get encrypted during the process. It is
thus reasonable to expect that most of the features extracted
by Drebin will remain unaffected.
Class Encryption. This is the most invasive obfuscation
strategy, as it encrypts all the application classes, except
entry-point ones (as they are required to load the application
externally). The encrypted classes are decrypted at runtime
by routines that are added during the obfuscation phase.
Worth noting, the class encryption performed by DexGuard
does not completely encrypt the application. For example,
classes belonging to the API components contained in the
manifest are not encrypted, as this would most likely
compromise the application functionality. For the same rea-
son, the manifest itself is preserved. Accordingly, it still
possible to extract static features using Drebin, and analyze
the application. Although out of the scope of our work, it
is still worth remarking here that using packers (e.g., [47])
to perform full dynamic loading of the application classes
might completely evade static analysis.
Combined Obfuscations. The aforementioned strategies
can also be combined to produce additional obfuscation
techniques. As in [30], we will consider three additional
techniques in our experiments, by respectively combining
(i) trivial and string encryption, (ii) adding reflection to
them, and (iii) adding class encryption to the former three.
5 ADVERSARIAL DETECTION
In this section, we introduce an adversary-aware approach
to improve the robustness of Drebin against carefully-
crafted data manipulation attacks. As for Drebin, we aim
to develop a simple, lightweight and scalable approach.
For this reason, the use of non-linear classification func-
tions with computationally-demanding learning procedures
is not suitable for our application setting. We have thus
decided to design a linear classification algorithm with
improved security properties, as detailed in the following.
5.1 Securing Linear Classification
As in previous work [8], [26], we aim to improve the security
of our linear classification system by enforcing learning
of more evenly-distributed feature weights, as this would
intuitively require the attacker to manipulate more features
to evade detection. Recall that, as discussed in Sect. 3.6,
if a large number of features has to be manipulated to
evade detection, it may not even be possible to construct
the corresponding malware sample without compromising
its malicious functionality. With respect to the work in [8],
[26], where different heuristic implementations were pro-
posed to improve the so-called evenness of feature weights
(see Sect. 6), we propose here a more principled approach,
derived from the idea of bounding classifier sensitivity to
feature changes.
We start by defining a measure of classifier sensitivity as:
∆f(x,x′) =
f(x)− f(x′)
‖x− x′‖ =
w>(x− x′)
‖x− x′‖ , (5)
which evaluates the decrease of f when a malicious sample
x is manipulated as x′, with respect to the required amount
of modifications, given by ‖x− x′‖.
Let us assume now, without loss of generality, thatw has
unary `1-norm and that features are normalized in [0, 1].3
We also assume that, for simplicity, the `1-norm is used to
evaluate ‖x−x′‖. Under these assumptions, it is not difficult
to see that ∆f ∈ [ 1d , 1], where the minimum is attained
for equal absolute weight values (regardless of the amount
of modifications made to x), and the maximum is attained
when only one weight is not null, confirming the intuition
3. Note that this is always possible without affecting system perfor-
mance, by dividing f by ‖w‖1, and normalizing feature values on a
compact domain before classifier training.
7that more evenly-distributed feature weights should improve
classifier security under attack. This can also be shown by
selecting x,x′ to maximize ∆f(x,x′):
∆f(x,x′) ≤ 1K
∑K
k=1|w(k)| ≤ maxj=1,...,d |wj | = ‖w‖∞.
(6)
Here, K = ‖x− x′‖ corresponds to the number of modified
features and |w(1)|, . . . , |w(d)| denote the weights sorted in
descending order of their absolute values, such that we have
|w(1)| ≥ . . . ≥ |w(d)|. The last inequality shows that, to
minimize classifier sensitivity to feature changes, one can
minimize the `∞-norm of w. This in turn tends to promote
solutions which exhibit the same absolute weight values (a
well-known effect of `∞ regularization [13]).
This is a very interesting result which has never been
pointed out in the field of adversarial machine learning. We
have shown that regularizing our learning algorithm by pe-
nalizing the `∞ norm of the feature weights w can improve
the security of linear classifiers, yielding classifiers with
more evenly-distributed feature weights. This has only been
intuitively motivated in previous work, and implemented
with heuristic approaches [8], [26]. As we will show in
Sect. 6, being derived from a more principled approach, our
method is not only capable of finding more evenly-distributed
feature weights with respect to the heuristic approaches
in [8], [26], but it is also able to outperform them in terms of
security.
It is also worth noting that our approach preserves
convexity of the objective function minimized by the learn-
ing algorithm. This gives us the possibility of deriving
computationally-efficient training algorithms with (poten-
tially strong) convergence guarantees. As an alternative to
considering an additional term to the learner’s objective
function L, one can still control the `∞-norm ofw by adding
a box constraint on it. This is a well-known property of
convex optimization [13]. As we may need to apply different
upper and lower bounds to different feature sets, depending
on how their values can be manipulated, we prefer to follow
the latter approach.
5.2 Secure SVM Learning Algorithm
According to the previous discussion, we define our Secure
SVM learning algorithm (Sec-SVM) as:
min
w,b
1
2w
>w + C
∑n
i=1 max (0, 1− yif(xi)) , (7)
s.t. wlbk ≤ wk ≤ wubk , k = 1, . . . , d . (8)
Note that this optimization problem is identical to Prob-
lem (2), except for the presence of a box constraint onw. The
lower and upper bounds on w are defined by the vectors
wlb = (wlb1 , . . . , w
lb
d ) and w
ub = (wub1 , . . . , w
ub
d ), which
should be selected with a suitable procedure (see Sect. 5.3).
For notational convenience, in the sequel we will also denote
the constraint given by Eq. (8) compactly as w ∈ W ⊆ Rd.
The corresponding learning algorithm is given as Al-
gorithm 1. It is a constrained variant of Stochastic Gradi-
ent Descent (SGD) that also considers a simple line-search
procedure to tune the gradient step size during the opti-
mization. SGD is a lightweight gradient-based algorithm
for efficient learning on very large-scale datasets, based on
approximating the subgradients of the objective function
using a single sample or a small subset of the training data,
randomly chosen at each iteration [12], [49]. In our case, the
subgradients of the objective function (Eq. 7) are given as:
∇wL u w + C
∑
i∈S ∇i` xi , (9)
∇bL u C
∑
i∈S ∇i` , (10)
where S denotes the subset of the training samples used
to compute the approximation, and ∇i` is the gradient of
the hinge loss with respect to f(xi), which equals −yi, if
yif(xi) < 1, and 0 otherwise.
One crucial issue to ensure quick convergence of SGD
is the choice of the initial gradient step size η(0), and of a
proper decaying function s(t), i.e., a function used to grad-
ually reduce the gradient step size during the optimization
process. As suggested in [12], [49], these parameters should
be chosen based on preliminary experiments on a subset
of the training data. Common choices for the function s(t)
include linear and exponential decaying functions.
We conclude this section by pointing out that our for-
mulation is quite general; one may indeed select different
combinations of loss and regularization functions to train
different, secure variants of other linear classification algo-
rithm. Our Sec-SVM learning algorithm is only an instance
that considers the hinge loss and `2 regularization, as the
standard SVM [18], [41]. It is also worth remarking that, as
the lower and upper bounds become smaller in absolute
value, our method tends to yield (dense) solutions with
weights equal to the upper or to the lower bound. A
similar effect is obtained when minimizing the `∞ norm
directly [13].
We conclude from this analysis that there is an implicit
trade-off between security and sparsity: while a sparse learn-
ing model ensures an efficient description of the learned
decision function, it may be easily circumvented by just
manipulating a few features. By contrast, a secure learning
model relies on the presence of many, possibly redundant,
features that make it harder to evade the decision function,
yet at the price of a dense representation.
5.3 Parameter Selection
To tune the parameters of our classifiers, as suggested
in [10], [48], one should not only optimize accuracy on a
set of collected data, using traditional performance evalua-
tion techniques like cross validation or bootstrapping. More
properly, one should optimize a trade-off between accuracy
and security, by accounting for the presence of potential,
unseen attacks during the validation procedure. Here we
optimize this trade-off, denoted with r(fµ,D), as:
µ? = arg maxµ r(fµ,D) = A(fµ,D) + λS(fµ,D) , (11)
where we denote with fµ the classifier learned with param-
eters µ (e.g., for our Sec-SVM, µ = {C,wlb,wub}), with A
a measure of classification accuracy in the absence of attack
(estimated onD), with S an estimate of the classifier security
under attack (estimated by simulating attacks on D), and
with λ a given trade-off parameter.
Classifier security can be evaluated by considering dis-
tinct attack settings, or a different amount of modifications
to the attack samples. In our experiments, we will optimize
8Algorithm 1 Sec-SVM Learning Algorithm
Input: D = {xi, yi}ni=1, the training data; C , the regulariza-
tion parameter; wlb,wub, the lower and upper bounds on
w; |S|, the size of the sample subset used to approximate
the subgradients; η(0), the initial gradient step size; s(t), a
decaying function of t; and ε > 0, a small constant.
Output: w, b, the trained classifier’s parameters.
1: Set iteration count t← 0.
2: Randomly initialize v(t) = (w(t), b(t)) ∈ W × R.
3: Compute the objective function L(v(t)) using Eq. (7).
4: repeat
5: Compute (∇wL,∇bL) using Eqs. (9)-(10).
6: Increase the iteration count t← t+ 1.
7: Set η(t) ← γ η(0)s(t), performing a line search on γ.
8: Set w(t) ← w(t−1) − η(t)∇wL.
9: Project w(t) onto the feasible (box) domainW .
10: Set b(t) ← b(t−1) − η(t)∇bL.
11: Set v(t) = (w(t), b(t)).
12: Compute the objective function L(v(t)) using Eq. (7).
13: until |L(v(t))− L(v(t−1))| < ε
14: return: w = w(t), and b = b(t).
security in a worst-case scenario, i.e., by simulating a PK
evasion attack with both feature addition and removal. We
will then average the performance under attack over an
increasing number of modified features m ∈ [1,M]. More
specifically, we will measure security as:
S = 1M
∑M
m=1A(fµ,D′k) , (12)
where D′k is obtained by modifying a maximum of m
features in each malicious sample in the validation set,4 as
suggested by the PK evasion attack strategy.
6 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we report an experimental evaluation of our
proposed secure learning algorithm (Sec-SVM) by testing it
under different evasion scenarios (see Sect. 3.5).
Classifiers. We compare our Sec-SVM approach with the
standard Drebin implementation (denoted with SVM), and
with a previously-proposed technique that improves secu-
rity of linear classifiers by using a Multiple Classifier System
(MCS) architecture to obtain a linear classifier with more
evenly-distributed feature weights [8], [26]. To this end,
multiple linear classifiers are learned by sampling uniformly
from the training set (a technique known as bagging [14])
and by randomly subsampling the feature set, as suggested
by the random subspace method [22]. The classifiers are then
combined by averaging their outputs, which is equivalent
to using a linear classifier whose weights and bias are the
average of the weights and biases of the base classifiers,
respectively. With this simple trick, the computational com-
plexity at test time remains thus equal to that of a single
linear classifier [8]. As we use linear SVMs as the base
4. Note that, as in standard performance evaluation techniques, data
is split into distinct training-validation pairs, and then performance is
averaged on the distinct validation sets. As we are considering evasion
attacks, training data is not affected during the attack simulation, and
only malicious samples in the validation set are thus modified.
classifiers, we denote this approach with MCS-SVM. We
finally consider a version of our Sec-SVM trained using only
manifest features that we call Sec-SVM (M). The reason is
to verify whether considering only features, which can not
removed, limits closely mimicking benign data and thereby
yields a more secure system.
Datasets. In our experiments, we use two distinct datasets.
The first (referred to as Drebin) includes the data used
in [3], and consists of 121, 329 benign applications and
5, 615 malicious samples, labeled using the VirusTotal ser-
vice. A sample is labeled as malicious if it is detected by
at least five anti-virus scanners, whereas it is labeled as
benign if no scanner flagged it as malware. The second
(referred to as Contagio) includes the data used in [30],
and consists of about 1, 500 malware samples, obtained
from the MalGenome5 and the ContagioMobileMinidump6
datasets. Such samples have been obfuscated with the seven
obfuscation techniques described in Sect. 4, yielding a total
of about 10, 500 samples.
Training-test splits. We average our results on 10 indepen-
dent runs. In each repetition, we randomly select 60,000
applications from the Drebin dataset, and split them into
two equal sets of 30,000 samples each, respectively used as
the training set and the surrogate set (as required by the
LK and mimicry attacks discussed in Sect. 3.5). As for the
test set, we use all the remaining samples from Drebin .
In some attack settings (detailed below), we replace the
malware data from Drebin in each test set with the malware
samples from Contagio . This enables us to evaluate the
extent to which a classifier (trained on some data) preserves
its performance in detecting malware from different sources.7
Feature selection. When running Drebin on the given
datasets, more than one million of features are found. For
computational efficiency, we retain the most discriminant
d′ features, for which |p(xk = 1|y = +1) − p(xk = 1|y =
−1)|, k = 1, . . . , d, exhibits the highest values (estimated on
training data). In our case, using only d′ = 10, 000 features
does not significantly affect the accuracy of Drebin. This is
consistent with the recent findings in [37], as it is shown
that only a very small fraction of features is significantly
discriminant, and usually assigned a non-zero weight by
Drebin (i.e., by the SVM learning algorithm). For the same
reason, the sets of selected features turned out to be the same
in each run. Their sizes are reported in Table 2.
Parameter setting. We run some preliminary experiments
on a subset of the training set and noted that changing C
did not have a significant impact on classification accuracy
for all the SVM-based classifiers (except for higher values,
which cause overfitting). Thus, also for the sake of a fair
comparison among different SVM-based learners, we set
C = 1 for all classifiers and repetitions. For the MCS-
SVM classifier, we train 50 base linear SVMs on random
subsets of 80% of the training samples and 50% of the
features, as this ensures a sufficient diversification of the
base classifiers, providing more evenly-distributed feature
weights. The bounds of the Sec-SVM are selected through a
5. http://www.malgenomeproject.org/
6. http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com/
7. Note however that a number of malware samples in Contagio are
also included in the Drebin dataset.
9TABLE 2
Number of features in each set for SVM, Sec-SVM, and MCS-SVM.
Feature set sizes for the Sec-SVM (M) using only manifest features
are reported in brackets. For all classifiers, the total number of selected
features is d′ = 10, 000.
Feature set sizes
m
a
n
i
f
e
s
t S1 13 (21)
d
e
x
c
o
d
e S5 147 (0)
S2 152 (243) S6 37 (0)
S3 2,542 (8,904) S7 3,029 (0)
S4 303 (832) S8 3,777 (0)
5-fold cross-validation, following the procedure explained
in Sect. 5.3. In particular, we set each element of wub
(wlb) as wub (wlb), and optimize the two scalar values
(wub, wlb) ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1} × {−1,−0.5,−0.1}. As for the
performance measure A(fµ,D) (Eq. 11), we consider the
Detection Rate (DR) at 1% False Positive Rate (FPR), while
the security measure S(fµ,D) is simply given by Eq. (12).
We set λ = 10−2 in Eq. (11) to avoid worsening the detection
of both benign and malware samples in the absence of attack
to an unnecessary extent. Finally, as explained in Sect. 5.2,
the parameters of Algorithm 1 are set by running it on a
subset of the training data, to ensure quick convergence, as
η(0) = 0.5, γ ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 70} and s(t) = 2−0.01t/√n.
Evasion attack algorithm. We discuss here the algorithm
used to implement our advanced evasion attacks. For linear
classifiers with binary features, the solution to Problem (4)
can be found as follows. First, the estimated weights wˆ have
to be sorted in descending order of their absolute values,
along with the feature values x of the initial malicious sam-
ple. This means that, if the sorted weights and features are
denoted respectively with wˆ(1), . . . , wˆ(d) and x(1), . . . , x(d),
then |wˆ(1)| ≥ . . . ≥ |wˆ(d)|. Then, for k = 1, . . . , d:
• if x(k) = 1 and wˆ(k) > 0 (and the feature is not in the
manifest sets S1-S4), then x(k) is set to zero;
• if x(k) = 0 and wˆ(k) < 0, then x(k) is set to one;
• else x(k) is left unmodified.
If the maximum number of modified features has been
reached, the for loop is clearly stopped in advance.
6.1 Experimental Results
We present our results by reporting the performance of the
given classifiers against (i) zero-effort attacks, (ii) obfusca-
tion attacks, and (iii) advanced evasion attacks, including
PK, LK and mimicry attacks, with both feature addition,
and feature addition and removal (see Sects. 3.5-3.6).
Zero-effort attacks. Results for the given classifiers in the
absence of attack are reported in the ROC curves of Fig. 2.
They report the Detection Rate (DR, i.e., the fraction of
correctly-classified malware samples) as a function of the
False Positive Rate (FPR, i.e., the fraction of misclassified
benign samples) for each classifier. We consider two dif-
ferent cases: (i) using both training and test samples from
Drebin (left plot); and (ii) training on Drebin and testing
on Contagio (right plot), as previously discussed. Notably,
MCS-SVM achieves the highest DR (higher than 96% at 1%
FPR) in both settings, followed by SVM and Sec-SVM, which
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Fig. 2. Mean ROC curves on Drebin (left) and Contagio (right) data, for
classifiers trained on Drebin data.
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Fig. 3. Absolute weight values in descending order (i.e., |w(1)| ≥ . . . ≥
|w(d)|), for each classifier (averaged on 10 runs). Flatter curves corre-
spond to more evenly-distributed weights, i.e., more secure classifiers.
only slightly worsen the DR. Sec-SVM (M) performs instead
significantly worse. In Fig. 3, we also report the absolute
weight values (sorted in descending order) of each clas-
sifier, to show that Sec-SVM classifiers yield more evenly-
distributed weights, also with respect to MCS-SVM.
DexGuard-based obfuscation attacks. The ROC curves
reported in Fig. 4 show the performance of the given
classifiers, trained on Drebin , against the DexGuard-based
obfuscation attacks (see Sect. 3.5.2 and Sect. 4) on the
Contagio malware. Here, Sec-SVM performs similarly to
MCS-SVM, while SVM and Sec-SVM (M) typically exhibit
lower detection rates. Nevertheless, as these obfuscation
attacks do not completely obfuscate the malware code, and
the feature changes induced by them are not specifically
targeted against any of the given classifiers, the classification
performances are not significantly affected. In fact, the DR at
1% FPR is never lower than 90%. As expected (see Sect. 4),
strategies such as Trivial, String Encryption and Reflec-
tion do not affect the system performances significantly, as
Drebin only considers system-based API calls, which are not
changed by the aforementioned obfuscations. Among these
attacks, Class Encryption is the most effective strategy, as it
is the only one that more significantly modifies the S5 and S7
feature sets (in particular, the first one), as it can be seen in
Fig. 5. Nevertheless, even in this case, as manifest-related
features are not affected by DexGuard-based obfuscations,
Drebin still exhibits good detection performances.
Advanced evasion. We finally report results for the PK,
LK, and mimicry attacks in Fig. 6, considering both feature
addition, and feature addition and removal. As we are
not removing manifest-related features, Sec-SVM (M) is
clearly tested only against feature-addition attacks. Worth
noting, Sec-SVM can drastically improve security compared
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Fig. 4. Mean ROC curves for all classifiers against different obfuscation techniques, computed on the Contagio data.
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Fig. 5. Fraction of features equal to one in each set (averaged on 10 runs), for non-obfuscated (leftmost plot) and obfuscated malware in Contagio,
with different obfuscation techniques. While obfuscation deletes dexcode features (S5-S8), the manifest (S1-S4) remains mostly intact.
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Fig. 6. Detection Rate (DR) at 1% False Positive Rate (FPR) for each classifier under the Perfect-Knowledge (left), Limited-Knowledge (middle),
and Mimicry (right) attack scenarios, against an increasing number of modified features. Solid (dashed) lines are obtained by simulating attacks
with feature addition (feature addition and removal).
to the other classifiers, as its performance decreases more
gracefully against an increasing number of modified fea-
tures, especially in the PK and LK attack scenarios. In the
PK case, while the DR of Drebin (SVM) drops to 60%
after modifying only two features, the DR of the Sec-SVM
decreases to the same amount only when fifteen feature
values are changed. This means that our Sec-SVM approach
can improve classifier security of about ten times, in terms
of the amount of modifications required to create a malware
sample that evades detection. The underlying reason is that
Sec-SVM provides more evenly-distributed feature weights,
as shown in Fig. 3. Note that Sec-SVM and Sec-SVM (M) ex-
hibit a maximum absolute weight value of 0.5 (on average).
This means that, in the worst case, modifying a single fea-
ture yields an average decrease of the classification function
equal to 0.5, while for MCS-SVM and SVM this decrease is
approximately 1 and 2.5, respectively. It is thus clear that, to
achieve a comparable decrease of the classification function
(i.e., a comparable probability of evading detection), more
features should be modified in the former cases. Finally, it
is also worth noting that mimicry attacks are less effective,
as expected, as they exploit an inferior level of knowledge
of the targeted system. Despite this, an interesting insight
on the behavior of such attacks is reported in Fig. 7. After
modifying a large number of features, the mimicry attack
tends to produce a distribution that is very close to that of
the benign data (even without removing any manifest-
related feature). This means that, in terms of their feature
vectors, benign and malware samples become very similar.
Under these circumstances, no machine-learning technique
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Fig. 7. Fraction of features equal to one in each set (averaged on 10 runs) for benign (first plot), non-obfuscated (second plot) and DexGuard-based
obfuscated malware in Drebin, using PK (third plot) and mimicry (fourth plot) attacks. It is clear that the mimicry attack produces malware samples
which are more similar to the benign data than those obtained with the PK attack.
TABLE 3
Top 5 modified features by the PK evasion attack with feature addition (A) and removal (R), for SVM, MCS-SVM, and Sec-SVM (highlighted in
bold). The probability of a feature being equal to one in malware data is denoted with p. For each classifier and each feature, we then report two
values (averaged on 10 runs): (i) the probability q′ that the feature is modified by the attack (left), and (ii) its relevance (right), measured as its
absolute weight divided by ‖w‖1. If the feature is not modified within the first 200 changes, we report that the corresponding values are only lower
than the minimum ones observed. In the last column, we also report whether the feature has been added (↑) or removed (↓) by the attack.
Feature Set Feature Name p SVM MCS-SVM Sec-SVM A (↑) / R (↓)
S6 susp calls::android/telephony/gsm/SmsMessage;→getDisplayMessageBody 2.40% 89.60% 0.25% 3.99% 0.05% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S1 req perm::android.permission.USE CREDENTIALS 0.05% 65.77% 0.18% 67.57% 0.13% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S1 req perm::android.permission.WRITE OWNER DATA 0.52% 64.76% 0.16% 49.23% 0.11% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S0 features::android.hardware.touchscreen 0.60% 64.01% 0.14% 41.75% 0.09% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S6 susp calls::android/telephony/gsm/SmsMessage;→getMessageBody 3.50% 60.13% 0.13% 17.30% 0.05% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S3 intent filters::android.intent.action.SENDTO 0.73% 55.70% 0.13% 60.38% 0.11% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S6 susp calls::android/telephony/CellLocation;→requestLocationUpdate 0.05% 50.87% 0.12% 48.37% 0.08% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S6 susp calls::android/net/ConnectivityManager;→getBackgroundDataSetting 0.51% 28.86% 0.07% 43.59% 0.09% <0.03% <0.02% ↑
S6 susp calls::android/telephony/TelephonyManager;→getNetworkOperator 46.41% 36.08% 0.17% 43.12% 0.19% 39.88% 0.04% ↓
S6 susp calls::android/net/NetworkInfo;→getExtraInfo 24.81% 19.25% 0.17% 13.42% 0.10% 10.25% 0.03% ↓
S6 susp calls::getSystemService 93.44% <3.53% <0.02% <0.12% <0.05% 11.02% 0.02% ↓
S7 urls::www.searchmobileonline.com 9.42% 4.59% 0.11% 6.91% 0.13% 4.83% 0.03% ↓
S6 services::com.apperhand.device.android.AndroidSDKProvider 10.83% 6.78% 0.13% 4.19% 0.09% 5.14% 0.03% ↓
can separate benign and malware data with satisfying accu-
racy. The vulnerability of the system may be thus regarded
as intrinsic in the choice of the feature representation, rather
than in how the classification function is learned. This
clearly confirms the importance of designing features that
are more difficult to manipulate for an attacker.
Feature manipulation. To provide some additional insights,
in Table 3 we report the top 5 modified features by the PK
attack with feature addition and removal for SVM, MCS-
SVM, and Sec-SVM. For each classifier, we select the top
5 features by ranking them in descending order of the
probability of modification q′. This value is computed as
follows. First, the probability q of modifying the kth feature
in a malware sample, regardless of the maximum number
of admissible modifications, is computed as:
q = Ex∼p(x|y=+1){xk 6= x′k} = pν(1− p)1−ν , (13)
where E denotes the expectation operator, p(x|y = +1)
the distribution of malware samples, xk and x′k are the
kth feature values before and after manipulation, and p is
the probability of observing xk = 1 in malware. Note that
ν = 1 if xk = 1, xk does not belong to the manifest
sets S1-S4, and the associated weight wˆk > 0, while ν = 0
if wˆk < 0 (otherwise the probability of modification q is
zero). This formula denotes compactly that, if a feature can
be modified, then it will be changed with probability p (in
the case of deletion) or 1 − p (in the case of insertion).
Then, to consider that features associated to the highest
absolute weight values are modified more frequently by the
attack, with respect to an increasing maximum number m of
modifiable features, we compute q′ = Em{q}. Considering
m = 1, . . . , d, with uniform probability, each feature will be
modified with probability q′ = q (d−r)/d, with r = 0 for the
feature x(1) assigned to the highest absolute weight value,
r = 1 for the second ranked feature x(2), etc. In general,
for the kth-ranked feature x(k), r = k − 1, for k = 1, . . . , d.
Thus, q′ decreases depending on the feature ranking, which
in turn depends on the feature weights and the probability
p of the feature being present in malware.
Regarding Table 3, note first how the probability of
modifying the top features, along with their relevance (i.e.,
their absolute weight value with respect to ‖w‖1), decreases
from SVM to MCS-SVM, and from MCS-SVM to Sec-SVM.
These two observations are clearly connected. The fact that
the attack modifies features with a lower probability de-
pends on the fact that weights are more evenly distributed.
To better understand this phenomenon, imagine the limit
case in which all features are assigned the same absolute
weight value. It is clear that, in this case, the attacker could
randomly modify any subset of features and obtain the same
effect on the classification output; thus, on average, each
feature will have the same probability of being modified.
The probability of modifying a feature, however, does
not only depend on the weight assigned by the classifier, but
also on the probability of being present in malware data, as
mentioned before. For instance, if a (non-manifest) feature
is present in all malware samples, and it has been assigned
a very high positive weight, it will be always removed;
conversely, if it only rarely occurs in malware, then it will
be deleted only from few samples. This behavior is clearly
exhibited by the top features modified by Sec-SVM. In
fact, since this classifier basically assigns the same absolute
weight value to almost all features, the top modified ones
are simply those appearing more frequently in malware.
More precisely, in our experiments this classifier, as a result
of our parameter optimization procedure, assigns a higher
(absolute) weight to features present in malware, and a
lower (absolute) weight to features present in benign data
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(i.e., |wubk | > |wlbk |, k = 1, . . . , d). This is why, conversely
to SVM and MCS-SVM, the attack against Sec-SVM tends to
remove features, rather then injecting them. To conclude, it
is nevertheless worth pointing out that, in general, the most
frequently-modified features clearly depend on the data
distribution (i.e., on class imbalance, feature correlations,
etc.), and not only on the probability of being more frequent
in malware. In our analysis, this dependency is intrinsically
captured by the dependency of q′ on the feature weights
learned by the classifier.
Robustness and regularization. Interestingly, a recent theo-
retical explanation behind the fact that more features should
be manipulated to evade our Sec-SVM can also be found
in [46]. In particular, in that work Xu et al. have shown that
the regularized SVM learning problem, as given in Eq. (7), is
equivalent to a non-regularized, robust optimization prob-
lem, in which the input data is corrupted by a worst-case
`2 (spherical) noise. Note that this noise is dense, as it tends
to slightly affect all feature values. More generally, Xu et
al. [46] have shown that the regularization term depends
on the kind of hypothesized noise over the input data. Our
evasion attacks are sparse, as the attacker aims to minimize
the number of modified features, and thus they significantly
affect only the most discriminant ones. This amounts to
consider an `1 worst-case noise over the input data. In this
case, Xu et al. [46] have shown that the optimal regularizer
is the `∞ norm ofw. In our Sec-SVM, the key idea is to add a
box constraint on w, as given in Eq. (8), which is essentially
equivalent to consider an additional `∞ regularizer on w,
consistently with the findings in [46].
7 LIMITATIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
Despite the very promising results achieved by our Sec-
SVM, it is clear that such an approach exhibits some intrinsic
limitations. First, as Drebin performs a static code analysis,
it is clear that also Sec-SVM can be defeated by more
sophisticated encryption and obfuscation attacks. However,
it is also worth remarking that this is not a vulnerability of
the learning algorithm itself, but rather of the chosen feature
representation, and for this reason we have not considered
these attacks in our work. A similar behavior is observed
when a large number of features is modified by our evasion
attacks, and especially in the case of mimicry attacks (see
Sect. 6), in which the manipulated malware samples almost
exactly replicate benign data (in terms of their feature vec-
tors). This is again possible due to an intrinsic vulnerability
of the feature representation, and no learning algorithm can
clearly separate such data with satisfying accuracy. Never-
theless, this problem only occurs when malware samples
are significantly modified and, as pointed out in Sect. 3.6,
it might be very difficult for the attacker to do that with-
out compromising their intrusive functionality, or without
leaving significant traces of adversarial manipulation. For
example, the introduction of changes such as reflective calls
requires a careful manipulation of the Dalvik registers (e.g.,
verifying that old ones are correctly re-used and that new
ones can be safely employed). A single mistake in the pro-
cess can lead to verification errors, and the application might
not be usable anymore (we refer the reader to [23], [24] for
further details). Another limitation of our approach may be
its unsatisfying performance under PK and LK attacks, but
this can be clearly mitigated with simple countermeasures
to prevent that the attacker gains sufficient knowledge of
the attacked system, such as frequent system re-training and
diversification of training data collection [9]. To summarize,
although our approach is clearly not bulletproof, we believe
that it significantly improves the security of the baseline
Drebin system (and of the standard SVM algorithm).
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Recent results in the field of adversarial machine learning
and computer security have confirmed the intuition pointed
out by Barreno et al. [4], [5], [25], namely, that machine
learning itself can introduce specific vulnerabilities in a se-
curity system, potentially compromising the overall system
security. The underlying reason is that machine-learning
techniques have not been originally designed to deal with
intelligent and adaptive attackers, who can modify their be-
havior to mislead the learning and classification algorithms.
The goal of this work has been, instead, to show that
machine learning can be used to improve system security,
if one follows an adversary-aware approach that proactively
anticipates the attacker. To this end, we have first exploited
a general framework for assessing the security of learning-
based malware detectors, by modeling attackers with dif-
ferent goals, knowledge of the system, and capabilities of
manipulating the data. We have then considered a specific
case study involving Drebin, an Android malware detection
tool, and shown that the performance of Drebin can be sig-
nificantly downgraded in the presence of skilled attackers
that can carefully manipulate malware samples to evade
classifier detection. The main contribution of this work has
been to define a novel, theoretically-sound learning algo-
rithm to train linear classifiers with more evenly-distributed
feature weights. This approach allows one to improve sys-
tem security (in terms of requiring a much higher number
of careful manipulations to the malware samples), without
significantly affecting computational efficiency.
A future development of our work, which may further
improve classifier security, is to extend our approach for
secure learning to nonlinear classifiers, e.g., using nonlinear
kernel functions. Although nonlinear kernels can not be di-
rectly used in our approach (due to the presence of a linear
constraint onw), one may exploit a trick known as the empir-
ical kernel mapping. It consists of first mapping samples onto
an explicit (approximate) kernel space, and then learning a
linear classifier on that space [39]. We would like to remark
here that also investigating the trade-off between sparsity
and security highlighted in Sect. 5.2 may provide interesting
insights for future work. In this respect, the recent findings
in [46] related to robustness and regularization of learning
algorithms (briefly summarized at the end of Sect. 6) may
provide inspiring research directions.
Another interesting future extension of our approach
may be to explicitly consider, for each feature, a different
level of robustness against the corresponding adversarial
manipulations. In practice, however, the agnostic choice of
assuming equal robustness for all features may be preferred,
as it may be very difficult to identify features that are more
difficult to manipulate. If categorizing features according
to their robustness to adversarial manipulations is deemed
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feasible, instead, then this knowledge may be incorporated
into the learning algorithm, such that higher (absolute)
weight values are assigned to more robust features.
It is finally worth remarking that we have also recently
exploited the proposed learning algorithm to improve the
security of PDF and Javascript malware detection systems
against sparse evasion attacks [20], [38]. This witnesses that
our proposal does not only provide a first, concrete exam-
ple of how machine learning can be exploited to improve
security of Android malware detectors, but also of how
our design methodology can be readily applied to other
learning-based malware detection tasks.
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